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Abstract
Purpose –The authors combine options logic with transaction cost economics to explain why firmsmaintain,
divest or buy out their international joint ventures (IJVs). It is suggested that a decline in environmental risk
and higher partner-related risk makes a firm more likely to acquire an IJV but less likely to divest an IJV. The
study also investigates how IJV agemoderates the effects of a decline in environmental risk and higher partner-
related risk.
Design/methodology/approach – The study employs competing risks analyses to examine the drivers of
different termination outcomes using a dataset consisting of 459 IJVs in the People’s Republic of China, of
which 110 were either acquired or divested by their foreign parent.
Findings – The study finds that changes in environmental risk and partner-related risk affect how firms
terminate their IJVs in the People’s Republic of China. Specifically, the authors find that the effect of exogenous
and endogenous risk are more pronounced for the acquisition of IJVs than for the divestment of IJVs.
Research limitations/implications – The study contributes to international marketing research by
complementing options logic with transaction cost economics to provide a theoretical explanation of the
different ways in which IJVs in the People’s Republic of China are terminated.
Practical implications – IJVs continue to be an important yet often unstable method to serve international
markets. Our findings increase managers’ awareness of the effect that two important sources of risk may have
on the termination of IJVs in the People’s Republic of China.
Originality/value – The study provides novel insights into the effect that changes in exogenous and
endogenous risk have on a firm’s choice of termination mode drawing on novel data on the different ways in
which foreign firms have terminated their IJVs in the Peoples’ Republic of China.
Keywords Joint ventures, Transaction costs, Environmental risk, IJV age, Options logic
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The establishment of an international joint venture (IJV) as an entry mode when firms seek to
expand overseas is a topic that has been widely considered in international marketing
research, drawing on theories, such as transaction cost economics (TCE) and the real options
perspective (e.g. Brouthers et al., 2003; 2008; Kogut, 1988a; Nippa andReuer, 2019; Surdu et al.,
2018). In contrast, we still know relatively little about why and how firms terminate an IJV.
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by acquiring their partner’s stake. Importantly, different ways of terminating an IJV, i.e.
different IJV termination modes, are likely to be driven by different factors, and the same
factor may have different effects on alternative IJV termination modes (e.g Mata and
Portugal, 2015). Factors that increase a firm’s propensity to buy out its partner may have the
opposite effect on its propensity to divest an IJV. Just as one cannot assume that the
determinants of foreign entry are the same across different entry modes, we cannot presume
that the causes of foreign divestment are the same across different exit modes (Engel et al.,
2013; Meschi and Wassmer, 2013; Nemeth and Nippa, 2013). The current lack of
understanding of what drives different IJV termination modes prevents international
marketing researchers from comparing the findings of prior research on the determinants of
IJV dissolution (Kogut, 1989; Meschi, 2005; Meschi and Riccio, 2008) and thus from providing
clear guidance to marketing practitioners. There is thus a need to explain the different
termination outcomes of IJVs. Drawing on various theories, particularly on TCE and the real
options perspective, existing international marketing research has put particular emphasis
on the role that exogenous and endogenous risk [1] plays in the management of IJVs and in
explaining IJV termination in general (Harrigan, 1985; Hennart and Zeng, 2002; Kogut, 1989).
Based on this suggested importance of exogenous and endogenous risk, we extend this
research by examining how these risks affect a firm’s choice of IJV termination mode.
Exogenous risk relates to the possible changes in a firm’s environment that affect a firm’s
operations, that is, risks arising from changes in the overall economic, political or financial
environment of a host country or from changes in the environment of the specific industry the
IJV operates in (e.g Chi and McGuire, 1996; Kogut, 1991; Krishnan et al., 2006). Such
exogenous risks are particularly pronounced in emerging economies, where environmental
changes are more likely and more pronounced when compared to those in developed
economies (Puck et al., 2013). Exogenous risk is beyond the firm’s control. Prior research
shows that such changes in the environment can affect the viability of an IJV and thus
threaten its survival (Kogut, 1989; Meschi, 2005; Meschi and Riccio, 2008). While prior
research has looked at the effect of exogenous risk on IJV dissolution in general, we do not
know if changes in the exogenous affect have different effects on different types of IJV
termination. Our first research question is thus: How does a decline in the level of
environmental (i.e. political, economic and financial) risk affect firms’ choice of IJV
termination mode?
In contrast to exogenous risk, endogenous risks are within a firm’s control; i.e. these are
risks that can be influenced by firms themselves (Ahsan and Musteen, 2011; Everett and
Watson, 1998). Prior research has discussed various factors that affect IJV dissolution by
increasing endogenous risk (e.g. Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Park and Russo, 1996). In the
context of an IJV, one of the key endogenous risks relates to the firm’s partner because the
partner’s motives, capabilities, and operating style cannot be known ex ante and there is a
risk that the partner behaves opportunistically (Chi and McGuire, 1996; Gulati and Singh,
1998; Krishnan, et al., 2006). This partner-related risk increases with the number of partners
involved in an IJV (e.g. Chung and Beamish, 2012) and is a particular concern in countries
where IJVs with multiple partners are more common due to greater government interference
in business, such as, for example, the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) (Mohr et al., 2016a, b).
To date, however, little attention has been paid to how endogenous risk, specifically the risk
associated with an increase in the number of IJV partners, affects a firm’s choice of a specific
IJV termination mode. Our second research question is thus:How does the partner-related risk
arising from multiple partners affect a firm’s choice of IJV termination mode?
Prior research has highlighted the effects of exogenous and endogenous risk on IJV
dissolution, but the mixed evidence so far suggests that these effects may be contingent on
particular characteristics of the partners and/or the IJVs (Nemeth and Nippa, 2013). Although
research has looked at the direct effect of IJV age on IJV survival (e.g. Dhanaraj and Beamish,
IMR
2004; Hennart and Zeng, 2002), an IJV’s age may moderate the effects of exogenous and
endogenous risk on IJV survival in general and on a firm’s choice of IJV termination mode.
The literature on the evolution of firms suggests that a firm’s susceptibility to exogenous risk
varies over time. Older firms may have developed resources and routines to deal with
environmental change and may also be less likely to reverse an investment decision because
of escalating commitment (Freeman et al., 1983; Sørensen and Stuart, 2000; Thornhill and
Amit, 2003). However, so far, we do not know if the effects of exogenous risk on a firm’s choice
of IJV termination mode vary over the lifetime of an IJV. We thus address the following third
research question:How does IJV age moderate the effect of a decline in environmental risk on a
firm’s choice of IJV termination mode?
An IJV’s age may also moderate the effect of endogenous risk on IJV survival. Prior
research suggests that over time, firms involved in IJVs develop relational capital (Park and
Russo, 1996; Slater and Robson, 2012). Because such relational capital is associated with a
decline in the (perceived) threat of opportunistic behavior (Park and Russo, 1996; Slater and
Robson, 2012), it may mitigate the effect that endogenous, partner-related risk has on IJV
termination. To date, however, our understanding of such a potential moderating effect of age
is limited. Our fourth research question is thus: How does IJV age moderate the effect of
partner-related risk on a firm’s choice of IJV termination mode?
We address these four research questions by combining the options perspective with
insights from TCE to examine how firms terminate their IJVs in the PRC and thus make the
following contributions. First, we contribute to a better understanding of firms’ choices of IJV
termination modes by providing an explanation of both divestment and acquisition that
accounts for the roles of exogenous and endogenous risk. Second, we contribute to the
development of options logic in the context of IJVs by complementing its focus on exogenous
risk with arguments fromTCE to examine the effects of endogenous risk and the moderating
role of IJV age. In so doing, we contribute to the development of options logic by showing that
the relationships implied by options logic are affected by constructs that are taken fromTCE.
We address our four research questions in the context of IJVs in the People’s Republic of
China (PRC), where IJVs continue to constitute a central means for foreign firms to enter the
market. Moreover, the active role of the Chinese government in shaping the environment of
foreign businesses and the associated changes in environmental risk make the PRC a good
setting to analyze the effects of changes in environmental risk on a firm’s choice of IJV
termination mode. We use data on 459 IJVs in the PRC that were established from 1985 to
2010 and either continued to operate as of the end of 2014 or were bought out or divested by
the foreign partner during this period.
2. Literature review
The determinants of firms’ choices regarding joint ventures when entering foreign markets
have received considerable attention in international marketing research (e.g. Brouthers,
et al., 2003; 2008; Surdu et al., 2018). Given the growing importance of the PRC and the
continued importance of collaborative entry modes when investing in the PRC, research has
put particular emphasis on explaining how firms enter the Chinese market (e.g Fong et al.,
2014; He et al., 2019). In contrast to explaining firms’ choices regarding IJVs in terms of the
alternative modes of entry, there has been comparatively little research into why firms
abandon joint ventures (e.g Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997).
Additionally, these studies did not account for the fact that IJVs may be terminated in
different ways. The following Table 1 shows selected empirical studies that examined IJV
termination in general, i.e. without differentiating between distinct IJV termination modes.
Most of the determinants of IJV dissolution that are investigated by the abovementioned








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































endogenous risk, i.e. risk that is shaped by firm decisions. Prior research has investigated
how various factors related to exogenous risk affect IJV survival (Kogut, 1989; Meschi, 2005;
Meschi and Riccio, 2008). Meschi (2005), for example, analyzed the effect of different facets of
environmental risk on the survival of IJVs and found that higher economic risk promotes IJV
survival, whereas IJV survival is not significantly affected by political risk. In contrast,
Meschi and Riccio (2008) expected economic and political risk to affect IJV survival but found
no empirical support for this hypothesis. Studies on the impact of exogenous risk on IJV
survival in general have often produced mixed results regarding the effect of exogenous risk
on the survival of IJVs, which highlights the potential importance of moderators.
Prior research has also examined the effect of factors related to endogenous risk. Studies
have investigated, for example, the equity stake in IJVs (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004), the
equity structure of IJVs (Lu and Hebert, 2005; Makino and Beamish, 1998; Steensma and
Lyles, 2000), the international and host country-specific experience of the foreign firm (Lu
and Hebert, 2005), whether partners have collaborated before or continue to collaborate in
other IJVs (Kogut, 1989), and the cultural distance between IJV partners (Barkema and
Vermeulen, 1997; Tower et al., 2019). Studies of the factors related to endogenous risk have
specifically highlighted partner-related risk and the increase in such risk associated with a
growing number of partner firms because multiparty IJVs are inherently more complex due
to the relationships among multiple partners; many of these studies focused on IJVs in the
PRC (see, for example, Beamish and Kachra, 2004; Chung and Beamish, 2012; Mohr et al.,
2016a, b). As in the case of studies of the effects of exogenous risk on IJV survival, research
into the effects of the factors related to endogenous risk on IJV survival has also provided
mixed findings. With regard to multiparty IJVs, for instance, while some studies find IJV
survival rates decrease with the number of partners, other studies find the opposite or
suggest a contingent effect (Chung and Beamish, 2012; Mohr et al., 2016a, b), which
suggests that the effects of endogenous risks on IJVsmight be contingent on characteristics
of the IJV and/or its partners.
Overall, while international marketing researchers have studied the dissolution of joint
ventures, there has been very little research on how firms terminate joint ventures, i.e.
through selling the joint venture or acquiring the partner firm’s stake. Existing studies of IJV
termination regularly refer to different termination modes, including the sale of a partner’s
stake to the other partner(s), the sale of a partner’s stake to a third party, the sale of all
partners’ stakes to other parties, and the liquidation of the IJV (see, for instance, Hennart and
Zeng, 2002). Although studies have explained IJV dissolution in general, there has been
comparatively little research investigating the drivers of such different termination outcomes
(please see Table 2).
As in the case of studies examining IJV dissolution in general, this research has focused on
determinants that are either exogenous or endogenous. Examining exogenous risk, Kogut
(1991), for example, investigated how unexpected increases in the value of the venture and the
degree of concentration in a JV’s industry affect the likelihood that a JV is acquired by one of
the partners. In a post-hoc test, Kogut (1991) found that the rates of termination through
acquisition are more stable than the rates of termination through dissolution. A
comparatively larger number of studies have examined the role of endogenous factors in
IJV termination outcomes (see, for example, Dussauge et al., 2000; Mata and Portugal, 2015;
Park and Russo, 1996). Park and Russo (1996) examined the effect of several determinants of
joint venture failure, including the effect of the number of partners in the joint venture.
Although differentiating between acquisitions and failures was not their main focus, Park
and Russo (1996) found that joint venture failures are linked to a different set of causal
variables than their acquisitions by one of the partners. In a similar vein, Dussauge et al.
(2000) compared the duration of link and scale alliances and suggested that technically





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Various studies have highlighted the need to include factors related to exogenous risk as
well as factors related to endogenous risk when explaining IJV termination outcomes
(Hennart et al., 1998; Hennart and Zeng, 2002; Kogut, 1988b; Reuer, 2002). For example, Kogut
(1988b) examined the effects of dominant control, size differences, industry concentration,
and a partner’s market access on the termination rates of domestic vs. international joint
ventures, which he differentiated into acquisitions (including those of third parties) and
dissolutions. Similarly, Hennart et al. (1998) discussed the effects of ownership, length of
experience, relatedness, the establishment mode, parent firm size and industry growth on the
longevity of the stakes in joint ventures vs. those in wholly owned subsidiaries while
distinguishing between two types of exit (sell off vs. liquidation). Hennart et al. (1998) also
found that Japanese firms were more likely to terminate their stakes in US joint ventures than
in wholly owned subsidiaries. In addition, prior research has provided explanations of IJV
performance that draw on factors related to both exogenous and endogenous risk (Krishnan
et al., 2006).
In both areas of research, i.e. explaining IJV termination in general and explaining IJV
termination modes in particular, scholars have adopted a number of different theoretical
frameworks to examine the drivers of IJV termination (see Tables 1 and 2). Apart from TCE,
which has also been the central approach used to explain choices regarding IJVs in terms of
the alternative modes of operation, options logic has been one of the central theoretical
explanations used to explain the termination of IJVs (Chi andMcGuire, 1996; Reuer and Tong,
2007; Tong et al., 2008). Various researchers have combined different theoretical approaches
when explaining a firm’s choice of IJV termination modes (Kogut, 1988b; Reuer, 2002).
Overall, while there has been some progress on differentiating IJV termination modes, we
still know very little about what drives these different terminationmodes. Differentiating and
understanding what drives firms’ choices of IJV termination modes is crucial, as it could be
one reason for the inconsistent empirical evidence. In this context, it is noteworthy that in
general, existing studies on IJV termination have focused on either exogenous factors or
endogenous factors, while relatively few studies have attempted to provide explanations that
account for both types of risk. We suggest that explaining firms’ choices of IJV termination
modes must account for both exogenous and endogenous risk.
3. Theoretical background
Existing research that combined different theoretical approaches has made particularly
strong contributions to both our understanding of a firm’s choice of a JV (e.g Brouthers et al.,
2008; Chi and McGuire, 1996; Folta and Leiblein, 1994) and to our knowledge of why firms
terminate IJVs (Meschi, 2005; Steensma and Lyles, 2000). The usefulness of combining
theoretical approaches has also been highlighted when explaining firms’ choices of IJV
termination modes (Kogut, 1988b; Nippa and Reuer, 2019; Reuer, 2002). Prior research has
often combined TCE and the options perspective because of their respective usefulness in
explaining IJVs as well as their complementary assumptions (Brouthers et al., 2008). We
suggest that the comparatively greater focus of the options perspective on changes in
exogenous risk should be complemented with attention to endogenous risk, which is central
to TCE. By combining options logic and TCE, our model is thus able to account for the effects
of both exogenous and endogenous risk on a firm’s choice of termination mode. Specifically,
we draw on options logic to examine how changes in exogenous risk affect how firms
terminate their IJVs in the PRC. We then draw on TCE to discuss the effects of endogenous
risk on a firm’s choice of IJV termination and how the effects of both exogenous and
endogenous risk might be contingent on how long an IJV has operated in the PRC.
Options logic has been used in international marketing research to examine, for example,




(Pauwels andMatthyssens, 2004). Prior research that draws on options logic in the context of
joint ventures has focused on the conditions under which a firm is likely to view an IJV as a
strategic option (e.g. Chi and McGuire, 1996; Cuypers and Martin, 2010; Reuer and Tong,
2005), the choice of an IJV as an entry mode (Brouthers et al., 2008; Folta, 1998), and the option
value that is associated with operating and terminating an IJV (Chi and McGuire, 1996;
Kumar, 2005; Reuer and Tong, 2007; Tong, et al., 2008). Options logic views IJVs as providing
firms with the option to divest, to maintain or to acquire an investment depending on the
development of the environmental conditions in the host country (Kogut, 1991; Reuer and
Tong, 2007). Alternative IJV termination outcomes thus reflect firms’ exercise of one of the
two options embedded in IJVs, whereas the decision not to exercise either option leads to
the maintenance of the IJV. Although the decisions regarding whether and when to exercise
the options are core elements of options logic (Folta, 1998), there has been little research on the
conditions that affect firms’ decisions to exercise the call (acquisition) or put (divestment)
options embedded in IJVs.
Options logic shares its focus on the role of risk with TCE logic, which has provided a
central explanation of a firm’s choice of an IJV to enter overseas markets (e.g. Hennart, 1988).
TCE has also been used to explain IJV termination in general, putting particular emphasis on
the endogenous, partner-related risk faced by firms establishing JVs (Chung and Beamish,
2012; Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Lu and Hebert, 2005). Central to TCE are the concepts of
bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior, which create uncertainty for firms,
specifically with regard to the protection of tangible and intangible assets (Hennart, 1988).
This uncertainty in turn affects firms’ decisions regarding how to organize economic
transactions and thus whether to adopt an IJV as a mode to enter a foreign market (Brouthers
et al., 2003).
Both options logic and TCE put particular emphasis on the risks associated with IJVs but
put slightly different emphasis on exogenous vs. endogenous risks. Similar to studies that
have combined both theories to explain the entry mode (e.g Brouthers et al., 2008; Chi and
McGuire, 1996; Folta and Leiblein, 1994), we suggest that such a combination is useful to
explain a firm’s choices of IJV termination modes. Based on this combination of options logic
and TCE we develop hypotheses that link changes in exogenous and endogenous risk to a
firm’s choice of IJV termination mode. Our conceptual framework in Figure 1 shows the
hypotheses thatwe develop in the next section.We expect that a decline in environmental risk
and the number of IJV partners – as a proxy for endogenous risk – affect the two IJV
termination modes, i.e., buy-out and divestment. Additionally, because of various
mechanisms associated with TCE, particularly the decline in perceived opportunism in
IJVs over time, we argue the age of an IJV to affect the direct effects of exogenous and





4.1 Environmental risk and firms’ choice of IJV termination mode
According to options logic, firms establish IJVs to obtain the option to divest, maintain, or
acquire an IJV depending on the development of the risk related to the investment. A
change in this risk affects the value of the investment in an IJV and of the different options
embedded in this investment. The level of exogenous risk is central to a firm’s decision to
invest in an option (Ahsan and Musteen, 2011), and the values of both the option to acquire
and the option to divest that are embedded in an IJV depend on the level of risk (Chi and
McGuire, 1996). Because a decline in environmental risk increases the value of the call
option (acquisition) but reduces the value of the put option (divestment), options logic
would imply that a decline in environmental risk would have opposite effects on firms’
decisions to divest and acquire IJVs.
When environmental risk declines, the call option, i.e. the option to acquire the IJV from the
local partner(s), becomes more valuable, and the exercise of this option through the
acquisition of the IJV thus becomes more likely. Under such conditions, the acquisition of an
IJV allows foreign firms to “capitalize on the growth option” that is embedded in the IJV (Tong
et al., 2008: 1014) and “respond to favorable environmental conditions in a timely manner
before they are dissipated by competitors” (Kumar, 2005: 323). Similarly, Kogut (1991) argues
that firms are more likely to acquire an IJV, that is, to exercise the call option, if there is an
unexpected but favorable demand shock, for example, a decline in environmental risk in the
economic domain. Accordingly, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H1a. A decline in environmental risk increases the likelihood that a foreign partner will
acquire an IJV.
In contrast, a decline in environmental risk reduces the value of the put option, which makes
firms less likely to exercise this option through the divestment of an IJV (Ahsan andMusteen,
2011; Kogut, 1991). Options logic suggests that IJVs – in contrast to wholly owned
subsidiaries – provide multinational enterprises with the option to quickly and easily divest
operations and to relocate operations to less risky locations (Chung et al., 2013). As
environmental risk declines, the value of the greater flexibility that is associated with IJVs
decreases (Tan and Sousa, 2015). This, in turn, reduces the value of the put option and thus
diminishes the likelihood that a firm will exercise its put option by divesting the IJV.
Therefore, based on options logic, a decline in environmental risk should decrease the
likelihood of IJV divestment. Based on this discussion, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H1b. A decline in environmental risk reduces the likelihood that a foreign partner will
divest an IJV.
In both cases, the alternative to exercising the option is to maintain the IJV.Without a decline
in environmental risk, the option to defer remainsmore valuable than either the put or the call
option (Ahsan andMusteen, 2011; Kumar, 2005; Papyrina, 2007; Tan and Sousa Carlos, 2015).
In this situation, a firm will maintain the IJV and continue to monitor the development of
environmental risk.
4.2 Partner-related risk and firms’ choice of IJV termination mode
TCE suggests that partner-related risk constitutes a central element of endogenous risk in
IJVs. Partner-related risk relates to the risk that the partner firmwill behave opportunistically
(Ali and Larimo, 2016; Chi and McGuire, 1996; Lu and Hebert, 2005). The level of partner-
related risk increases with the number of partners involved in an IJV. This is because of the
higher monitoring and coordination costs, greater levels of imperfect information, the higher




greater chance of dysfunctional pairings (Beamish and Kachra, 2004; Chung and Beamish,
2012; Park and Russo, 1996; Parkhe, 1993). Because allocating responsibility becomes more
difficult with an increase in the number of partners, opportunistic behavior also becomes
more likely (Chung and Beamish, 2012). An increase in partner-related risk will increase
transaction costs. Because they are faced with higher transaction costs, firms are more likely
to organize economic transactions through internal hierarchies rather than using the market
mechanism or hybrid mechanisms, such as IJVs. Under these circumstances, firms are thus
more likely to internalize transactions by converting their IJV to a fully owned subsidiary
(Pangarkar and Klein, 2004). Thus, as the number of partner firms increases, the call option,
i.e. the option to acquire the IJV from the other partner(s), becomes more valuable than the
option to maintain the IJV. The exercise of the call option through the acquisition of the IJV
thus becomes more likely. Accordingly, we formulate the following hypothesis.
H2a. As the number of partners increases, the likelihood that a foreign partner will
acquire an IJV increases.
The risk associated with an increase in the number of partners will also increase the
likelihood that the firm divests the IJV rather than maintaining the IJV. As in the case of
dyadic IJVs, contracts may or may not explicitly stipulate the right of one or more of the
partners to buy out the other partners or sell its stake to the other partners. In the absence of
such explicit stipulations, however, firmsmay not be able to buy outmultiple partners ormay
only be able to do so by incurring high costs. This is because obtaining the agreement of an
increasing number of partners might bemore costly than pulling out of the IJV and setting up
awholly owned operation instead. As a result, the value of the put option should increasewith
the greater partner-related risk associated with an increase in the number of IJV partners.
This assumption is in line with Hennart and Zeng (2002), who stress how the increased
transaction costs associated with an increase in the number of IJV partners can increase the
likelihood of IJV dissolution. We thus expect the endogenous risk associated with a growing
number of IJV partner firms to increase the likelihood of divestment, vis-a-vis the option to
maintain the IJV. Accordingly, we formulate the following hypothesis.
H2b. As the number of partners increases, the likelihood that a foreign partner will divest
an IJV increases.
4.3Themoderating influence of IJV age on the effect of environmental risk and firms’ choice
of IJV termination mode
A firm’s propensity to acquire an IJV because of a decline in environmental risk will decrease
with IJV age because of the relational capital and structural attachment between partners that
develop over time. Relational capital creates psychological deterrents to acquiring an IJV,
which make firms less likely to “drop” their IJV partner when environmental risk declines.
Similarly, structural attachment based on the history of firm-specific investments made since
the establishment of the IJV increases with the age of the IJV (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). If
the partners have developed a strong attachment and have invested in their relationship over
time, inertia forces may work against intentions to abandon the partners (Inkpen and
Beamish, 1997). This growing structural attachment and the associated mutual
interdependence between the partners reduce the foreign firm’s desire to buy out the local
partner(s). Therefore, both relational capital and the structural attachment that develop over
time can deter foreign firms from acquiring their IJV, thus mitigating the effect that a decline
in environmental risk has on the likelihood that firms will terminate an IJV through
acquisition. The degree to which a foreign firm can reduce transaction costs by transitioning
from joint to hierarchical coordination – i.e. by acquiring an IJV – declines as relational capital
and structural attachment develop over time. Consequently, the increase in the value of the
IMR
call option (i.e. acquisition) resulting from a decline in environmental risk is lower for older
IJVs than for younger IJVs. Therefore, a firm’s propensity to respond to a decline in
environmental risk by acquiring an IJV declines with IJV age. Accordingly, we formulate the
following hypothesis:
H3a. IJV age weakens the positive effect of a decline in environmental risk on the
likelihood that a foreign firm will acquire an IJV.
Similarly, as an IJV ages, firms become even less likely to respond to a decline in
environmental risk by divesting an IJV. This is again due to the relational capital and
structural attachment that develop over time, as mentioned above (Inkpen and Beamish,
1997), which reduces the likelihood that firms will divest an IJV. Additionally, the growing
relational capital and associated trust between partners means that partners “limit their
cognitive efforts. . ..when they consider their broader environment” as they increasingly rely
on the information provided by their partner(s) (Krishnan et al., 2006: 894–895). Consequently,
firms may not react or not react adequately to changes in the environment. The development
of relational capital and trust over time may lead to a “buffering” of the effect of a change in
the environmental risk on a firm’s decision to divest an IJV. Additionally, as an IJV ages, there
may also be additional psychological deterrents to IJV divestment related to sunk costs,
overconfidence and escalating commitment (Adner and Levinthal, 2004). These
considerations might lead firms to ignore or downplay changes in the environment and
make it less likely that firms will divest an IJV under declining environmental risk.
Accordingly, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H3b. IJV age strengthens the negative effect of a decline in environmental risk on the
likelihood that a foreign firm will divest an IJV.
4.4 Themoderating influence of IJV age on the effect of partner-related risk on firms’ choice
of IJV termination mode
Options logic and TCE-based explanations of IJVs suggest that as IJV age increases, the
uncertainty regarding partner firms’ capabilities and potential opportunistic behavior
decreases (Chi and McGuire, 1996; Folta, 1998). This assumption is supported by research on
the role of time in the development of relational capital and trust in IJVs (e.g. Kale et al., 2000;
Mohr and Puck, 2013). Partner-related risk is endogenous because foreign firms can resolve it
by employing monitoring and control mechanisms, introducing specific routines for
cooperating with each other or obtaining additional information on their partners (Lu and
Hebert, 2005; Pangarkar and Klein, 2004). As the age of an IJV increases, foreign firms obtain
more information on their partners and become more knowledgeable about their partners.
Such knowledge and understanding about the partners can improve the foreign firm’s ability
to predict the partners’ future behavior (Lu andHebert, 2005), whichmitigates partner-related
risk in multipartner IJVs. Relational capital and the associated decrease in the (perceived)
threat of opportunistic partner behavior improve the cost efficiency of the IJV as a
governance mechanism compared with a wholly owned subsidiary, that is, the alternative
and hierarchical mechanism for organizing transactions (Williamson, 1991). Parkhe (1993:
803) suggests that “[t]he older a relationship, the greater the likelihood it has passed through a
critical shakeout period of conflict and influence attempts by both sides.” The decrease in
partner-related risk that is associated with increasing IJV age will therefore moderate the
effect of multipartner risk on the likelihood that foreign firms will exercise the call and put
options embedded in their IJVs.
The increase in the value of the call option (i.e. an acquisition) that is caused by
multipartner risk is lower for older IJVs. A firm’s propensity to respond to higher partner-




capital is developed over time. As an IJV ages, partner-related risk and its associated costs
decline as relational capital develops over time. The likelihood that a foreign firmwill acquire
an IJV in response to the greater risk associated with multipartner IJVs thus declines with IJV
age. Accordingly, we formulate the following hypothesis.
H4a. IJV age weakens the positive effect of an increasing number of IJV partners on the
likelihood that a foreign firm will acquire an IJV.
However, a firm’s propensity to divest an IJV because of the partner-related risk arising from
having multiple partners will decrease because of the relational capital that has developed
between the partners over time. The relational capital developed over time reduces conflicts
between partners and the need to monitor partners because of the decline in the perceived
threat of opportunistic behavior (Chi and McGuire, 1996). As the IJV ages, the partners are
likely to develop routines and processes to coordinate and manage the contributions of
multiple partners. Because of this reduction in transaction costs over time, the value of the put
option relative to the value of the option to maintain the IJV declines as the IJV ages. The
likelihood that a foreign firm will divest an IJV because of the endogenous risks associated
with a growing number of IJV partners is likely to reduce with IJV age. Accordingly, we
formulate the following hypothesis.
H4b. IJV age weakens the positive effect of an increasing number of IJV partners on the
likelihood that a foreign firm will divest an IJV.
5. Methods
5.1 Research context and sample
To test our hypotheses, we decided to examine IJVs in a setting that is characterized by high
levels and high variability in exogenous and endogenous risk. This type of environment is
particularly found in emerging economies, which tend to promise great opportunities but
cause foreign investors to be faced with high levels of risk. We chose the PRC as the context
for our study because of the important role that IJVs have traditionally played for foreign
investors entering China and because of the significant changes in environmental risk in
China over the past decades.
We extracted data on IJVs in the PRC announced between 1985 and 2010 from the
Thomson SDC database. We considered IJVs where the foreign partner had at least 10%
ownership and up to 90% ownership. The SDC database does not provide information
about whether or how an IJV was terminated. We thus gathered additional information on
the termination modes for a randomly selected set of 2,000 IJVs by conducting searches on
other databases, such as LexisNexis, and general web searches. We used data from only
quality newspapers or news services. The SDC database provided the dissolution date for
61 of the 2,000 IJVs; we excluded these IJVs. We also excluded IJVs if restrictions on foreign
ownership existed at the time of IJV establishment. For the remaining IJVs, we collected
information to determine whether they continued to operate, had been acquired by the
foreign partner firm, or had been divested by the foreign partner firm.We removed 14 cases
in which a foreign firm divested the IJV but established a wholly owned operation in the
same sector within one year of divestment. We excluded these cases to ensure that IJV
divestment did not reflect increased commitment to the market. Our final sample comprised
459 IJVs [2], of which 110 IJVs (24.0%) no longer existed and 349 (76.0%) remained in
operation at our cut-off date. Among the 110 terminated IJVs, 62 (56.4%) were divested by
the foreign partner, and 48 (43.6%) were bought out/acquired by the foreign firm. Table 3
shows the years the IJVs were acquired or divested. Table 4 gives a breakdown of the age of
the surviving IJVs at the end of the time period.
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In contrast tomost previous studies on IJV survival, here, we recoded the 459 IJVs into a panel
formation, which was necessary to account for variations in the decline in environmental risk
over each IJV’s lifetime and thus allowed us to treat the decline in environmental risk as a
time-varying variable. For example, we divided an IJV established in 1990 and terminated in
1995 into five observations that captured the five “life periods” of 1990–1991, 1990–1992,
1990–1993, 1990–1994 and 1990–1995. For this IJV, the change in environmental risk may
have been positive in the first four periods but negative over the entire period of 1990–1995.



















































Failing to account for this variation would mean that the change in environmental risk from
1990 to 1995 is used to explain the nontermination of the IJV in 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994, i.e.
events that lie in the past. Because we coded repeated observations for each of the 459 IJVs,
our data contained 5,379 observations.
5.2 Dependent and independent variables
Our dependent variable, IJV terminationmode, takes one of three values: it assumes the value
of 0 if the IJV continues to exist at the end of our observation period, the value of 1 if the IJV
was divested, and the value of 2 if the IJV was bought out by the foreign firm.
To measure the decline in environmental risk, we use data obtained from the International
Country Risk Guide published by the PRS group. These data contain annual assessments of
economic, political and financial risks, and higher values indicate higher risk (maximum
score: 100). We calculate the decline in environmental risk over the lifetime of an IJV by
subtracting one of the following scores from the risk score in the year before the IJV was
established. For terminated IJVs, we subtracted the risk score for the year before the IJV was
divested or was bought out. For surviving IJVs, we subtract the risk score for the year before
our cut-off date, namely, December 31, 2010. We carried out factor analysis on these three
indicators (i.e. the decline in economic risk, the decline in political risk and the decline in
financial risk) to combine these three individual items into a single variable reflecting the
decline in overall environmental risk that foreign firms faced in the PRC. Factor analysis is a
commonly used technique to construct a composite index. Nielsen (2007), for example,
constructs an overall index of country risk through factor analysis and similarly, Konara and
Wei (2019) construct composite indices of language capital and human capital through factor
analysis. Various other studies have also used factor analysis to condense the information
contained in a set of variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated dimensions (factors) (see, for
example, Dong and Glaister, 2006; Zeng et al., 2009). According to Kaiser (1960), factors with
an eigenvalue larger than one should be retained. In our case, the eigenvalue of the first
principle factor was 1.66, and the eigenvalue of the next (second) principle factor was 0.05
(significantly smaller than one). Therefore, only the first factor satisfies this condition, and
thus, we use the first factor from the factor analysis output as the composite variable [3].
Positive values for this variable reflect a decline in risk.
We capture the partner-related risk arising from having multiple partners by the number
of partners in the IJV, as is commonly done in the prior literature (e.g. Beamish and Kachra,
2004; Hennart and Zeng, 2005). To measure IJV age, which is our moderating variable, we
follow prior research and use the logarithm of the number of years since the establishment of
the IJV (Bai et al., 2019).
5.3 Control variables
We control for several variables that could affect the risk of IJV dissolution in general and/or
the specific risk that a foreign firm will divest or buy out an IJV (Nemeth and Nippa, 2013;
Reuer and Zollo, 2005). First, we control for the size of a foreign firm’s equity stake (Foreign
Partner Stake). Research that applies options logic to IJVs indicates that firms with small
equity stakes are more likely to view IJVs as a real option because large initial ownership
positions reduce the value of the growth option (Chi and McGuire, 1996; Cuypers and Martin,
2010; Kogut, 1991; Tong et al., 2008). Although options logic does not indicate whether a
particular termination outcome is more or less likely if a foreign firm holds a small equity
stake, other research proposes that an increasing equity share that is held by a foreign firm
reduces the (local) partner’s opportunistic behavior, which makes divestment less likely
(Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). Moreover, a higher equity share has been associated with a
higher level of commitment and thus with an increase in the likelihood that a partner will buy
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out its IJV (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). Prior research has provided empirical evidence of
both effects (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Mata and Portugal, 2015).
Prior studies have also argued that the risk of IJV dissolution differs depending on
whether the equity is equally shared among partners (see, for instance, Park and Ungson,
1997). Thus, consistent with Park and Ungson (1997), we use a dummy variable (Parity JV)
that takes the value of 1 for IJVs in which the partners hold equal equity stakes and the value
of 0 for IJVs in which the partners do not hold equal equity stakes.
Research has emphasized that whether partners operate in the same or different sectors
affects IJV survival (e.g. Dussauge et al., 2000). Firms with partners that operate in different
industries are less likely to replicate the partners’ contributions to the IJV. Dussauge et al.
(2000) find that some particular link alliances are more likely to be acquired than scale
alliances. We followed prior research and used a dummy variable (Intraindustry IJV) to
account for IJVs in which the partners operate in the same sector (Yang et al., 2011). We also
controlled for the foreign firms’ experience by using the total number of prior IJVs that a
foreign firm had established in the PRC (Tong et al., 2008). In cases in which an IJV hadmore
than one foreign partner, we calculated the sum of this index across all of the foreign
partners. To account for changes in the general investment climate in the PRC, we
controlled for whether an IJVwas established prior to or after the PRC’s entry into theWTO
(Post2001).
Prior studies emphasize the relevance of parent size for the survival of subsidiaries (e.g.
Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). Because the information that is provided by SDC Platinum
regarding the size of foreign firms is incomplete and becausemost firms in our sample are not
publicly listed, we adopt the approach that is used by Shi et al. (2014) and control for whether
a foreign firm is listed in the Fortune Global 500. We also consider the cultural distance
between a foreign partner’s home country and China. Cultural distance is a composite
variable based on Hofstede’s five cultural dimensions [4] and is calculated by using the
Euclidean method (Konara andMohr, 2019). Prior research on the survival of IJVs in the PRC
controls for whether an IJV is located in one of the more economically developed coastal
regions of the PRC or in a region in the less developed hinterland. Instead of using a dummy
variable that is used in most prior research, we capture the differences in economic
development and marketization, i.e. the degree of market-oriented reform, including
liberalization and privatization, among Chinese provinces by using the National Economic
Research Institute (NERI) Index of Marketization. This index was developed by the NERI
Reform Foundation and has been used to capture the level of marketization across Chinese
provinces (e.g Fan andWang, 2001; Fan et al., 2010; Li et al., 2009; Zhou et al., 2017). The NERI
index is computed using data collected through surveys completed by a large number of
enterprises across Chinese provinces (marketization). The Index combines 23 indicators
relating to five themes: government-market relations, the non-state enterprise sector, the
commodity market, factor markets and the legal framework. Provinces are given scores
between 0 and 10 for each of these 23 indicators relative to the best and worst performing
provinces. These scores are then aggregated into an index for each year for every province
(Gang et al., 2018). We also include industry dummies [5] to account for industry-specific
factors that may influence the likelihood or ability of a foreign firm to maintain an IJV or to
choose a particular termination mode (Kumar, 2005).
6. Analyses and results
6.1 Analytical approach
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics and the correlations among our variables. The
correlation coefficients are generally low, except for the correlation coefficient between IJV































































































































































































































































































































































































We also carry out a VIF analysis to check for any potential multicollinearity. All the
variables have very low VIF scores, ranging between 1.02 and 1.67, confirming that
multicollinearity was not a concern.
We assume that the foreign firm makes a decision every year about whether to continue
(i.e. exercise the option to defer), buy out the local partner(s) (i.e. exercise the option to acquire),
or divest its stake in the IJV (i.e. exercise the option to divest). There are thus two durations,
namely, the time until acquisition and the time until divestment. We employ a competing risk
hazard approach. Acquisitions are treated as censored when explaining divestment, and
divestments are treated as censored when explaining acquisition. According to Esteve-Perez
et al. (2010: 282), survivalmethods aremore appropriate than cross-sectional techniques in the
analysis of business exits because survival methods “allow to account for both whether and
when an event occurs (i.e. exit), thus controlling for the evolution of the risk of each exit form
over time.”The key assumption in proportional hazard models is that the hazard ratio for the
two events depends only on the covariates and does not depend on time. Because we propose
that the effect of a decline in environmental risk on the hazard level depends on IJV age, we
relax the proportionality assumption and include an interaction term between our
environmental risk variable and the logarithm of IJV age. This approach is recommended
when a covariate’s influence on the hazard level varies over time, that is, with time-varying
coefficients (Ruhe, 2016). To reduce the issue of multicollinearity when including interaction
terms, we apply the residual centering procedure (Lance, 1988) to address the correlation
between the interaction term and the variable that captures the decline in environmental risk.
6.2 Results
Table 6 shows the results of our competing risk analyses. The results for themodel testing the
direct effects hypothesized in hypotheses 1a to 2b are reported in panel 6.1. The results for the
likelihood that a foreign firm will acquire an IJV are reported in column 1, and the results for
the likelihood that a foreign firm will divest an IJV are reported in column 2.
We expected that a decline in environmental risk in the PRCwould increase the likelihood
that a foreign firm will acquire its IJV (hypothesis 1a). The coefficient for the decline in
environmental risk is positive and statistically significant (1.022, p 5 0.000), providing
support for hypothesis 1a.We expected that a decline in environmental risk in the PRCwould
reduce the likelihood that a foreign firm will divest an IJV (hypothesis 1b). The coefficient for
the decline in environmental risk is not statistically significant (0.207, p5 0.167); therefore, we
do not find support for our hypothesis 1b. However, we do find empirical support for this
hypothesis after the first year, as explained below, wherewe discuss themoderating effects of
IJV age.
We expected that as the number of partners in an IJV increases, the likelihood that a
foreign partner will acquire its IJV in the PRC would increase (hypothesis 2a). The coefficient
for the number of partners is positive and statistically significant (0.407, p5 0.035), providing
support for hypothesis 2a. We also expected the likelihood that a foreign firm will divest its
IJV in the PRC will increase with an increase in the number of partners in the IJV (hypothesis
2b). The coefficient for the number of partners is not statistically significant (0.029, p5 0.861);
therefore, we do not find support for our hypothesis 2b.
To test hypotheses 3a and 3b, i.e. the moderating effect of IJV age on the effect of a decline
in environmental risk on the likelihood that a foreign firm will acquire/divest an IJV, we
interacted IJV age with the decline in environmental risk. The results are reported in panel 6.2
in Table 6. The interaction term between the decline in environmental risk and IJV age is
negative for acquisition (0.303, p 5 0.041). This supports hypothesis 3a, where we argued
that IJV age weakens the positive effect of a decline in environmental risk on the likelihood






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































environmental risk in the PRC and IJV age is negative for divestment (0.191, p5 0.040). Our
results indicate that there is no statistically significant effect in the first year (when IJV
age 5 1). Because the coefficient for the decline in environmental risk is not statistically
significant (0.144, p 5 0.346), we can consider it statistically not different from zero, which
means that the effect of the decline in environmental risk is negative beginning in year two
(when IJV age5 2) and that it becomes further negative when IJV age increases. Therefore, a
decline in environmental risk reduces the likelihood that a foreign firmwill divest an IJV, and
this effect becomes stronger with IJV age. These results provide strong support for
hypothesis 3b.
To test hypotheses 4a and 4b regarding themoderating influence of IJV age on the effect of
the number of partners on the likelihood that a foreign firm will acquire/divest an IJV, we
interacted IJV age with the number of partners. The results are reported in panel 6.3 in
Table 6. The interaction term between the number of partners and IJV age is negative for
acquisition (0.156, p5 0.036). This supports hypothesis 4a, where we argued that IJV age
weakens the positive effect of endogenous, partner-related risk on the likelihood that a foreign
firm will acquire its IJV in the PRC. The interaction between the number of partners and IJV
age was not significant for divestment (0.010, p5 0.962). We thus did not find support for
our hypothesis 4b in which we expected IJV age to weaken the positive effect of endogenous,
partner-related risk on the likelihood that a foreign firm will divest an IJV.
Regarding the control variables, the coefficient for foreign partner stake is positive for
acquisition (0.038, p5 0.000, see panel 6.1 in Table 6), which indicates that foreign partners
with larger stakes in their IJVs aremore likely to buy out their IJVs in the PRC. The coefficient
for parity IJV is positive for divestment (0.403, p5 0.056) and indicates that foreign firms in
the PRC are more likely to divest equally shared IJVs than to divest IJVs in which they hold
either a minority or majority stake. The coefficient for intraindustry IJV is positive for both
acquisition (2.134, p5 0.013) and divestment (0.650, p5 0.094), which indicates that foreign
firms are more likely to buy out than sell off related IJVs in the PRC. The coefficient for
Post2001, accounting for the PRC’s entry into the WTO in 2001, is positive for both
acquisition (1.163, p 5 0.000) and divestment (0.819, p 5 0.002). This finding provides
evidence of increased acquisition and divestment activity in the post-2001 era. The coefficient
of FortuneGlobal500 is positive for acquisition (1.176, p5 0.000) but negative for divestment
(0.608, p 5 0.000). In the PRC, foreign firms in this group are thus more likely to buy out
their IJVs and less likely to divest their IJVs. The coefficient for cultural distance is positive
for acquisition (0.601, p 5 0.000), indicating that foreign firms from culturally distant
countries are more likely to acquire their IJVs in the PRC. It is negative for divestment
(0.268, p 5 0.037), indicating that foreign firms from culturally distant countries are less
likely to divest IJVs in the PRC. The coefficient for the marketization level of the Chinese
province in which an IJV is located (0.307, p5 0.000) shows that foreign firms are less likely
to buy out IJVs in marketized provinces.
Finally, our results show that IJV termination through acquisition is more likely in the
manufacturing sector (SIC 20–39), the transportation, communications, electric, gas, and
sanitary services sector (SIC 40–49), and in the wholesale and retail trade (SIC 50–59).
Similarly, the descriptive statistics show that whereas termination through divestment took
place across all sectors, acquisitions of IJVs took place only in the manufacturing sector (SIC
20–39), the transportation, communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services sector (SIC
40–49), and in the wholesale and retail trade sector (SIC 50–59). We also find that in the
manufacturing sector (SIC 20–39) and the wholesale and retail trade (SIC 50–59) sectors, a
similar percentage of IJVs was terminated through divestment and through acquisition;
however, in the transportation, communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services sector
(SIC 40–49), IJVs were more likely to be terminated through divestment than through
acquisition (please see Table 7).
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6.3 Robustness checks
To check the robustness of our results, we carried out additional analyses. First, prior
research has suggested the possibility of a so-called honeymoon period [6], i.e. the initial
period of an IJV’s existence duringwhich the termination of an IJV is less likely.We tested this
possibility by excluding IJVs that existed for less than two years from our analyses and
rerunning our analyses. The results of these analyses are consistent with the results based on
our entire sample, and there does not seem to be an effect of a potential honeymoon period in
our sample. Second, we used an alternative measure of external risk by carrying out factor
analyses with orthogonal rotation (varimax rotation) and with oblique rotation (promax
rotation) of the factor loadings matrix. All our results remained intact. We also used an
alternative measure of external risk by averaging our three measures of risk rather than
using factor analysis. The results remained consistent. We replaced the 5-dimensional
measure of cultural distance with the 6-dimensional measure of cultural distance (Hofstede
et al., 2010) as a further robustness check, and our results remained largely intact. Finally, we
carried out a robustness test by including both interaction terms together (panel 6.4 in table 4)
and the results remain intact.
7. Discussion and implications
Combining options logic with TCE arguments, we developed hypotheses regarding the
effects of a decline in environmental risk and partner-related risk arising from having
multiple partners on the likelihood that firms will either acquire or divest IJVs. We expected
that a decline in environmental risk in the PRC would increase the likelihood that foreign
firms will acquire their IJVs (hypothesis 1a). Our results provide support for this hypothesis.
This finding is also consistent with prior research that draws on options logic to study the
effects of changes inmarket uncertainty on firms’ decisions onwhether to acquire JVs (Kogut,
1991). Although Kogut (1991) focuses on favorable economic shocks, i.e. short-term changes
in external uncertainty, our results emphasize the role of reduced environmental (i.e. political,
economic and financial) risks over the entire lifetime of an IJV. In contrast to Kogut (1991), we
highlight the role of changes in the broader environment. We suggest that such changes are
particularly pronounced in most emerging economies, including the PRC. Although they do
not draw on options logic, Puck et al. (2009) similarly find that foreign firms that perceive no
decline in external uncertainty are less likely to convert their IJVs into wholly owned
subsidiaries. Puck et al. (2009) draw on TCE to argue that a reduction in uncertainty induces
firms to acquire their IJVs in the PRC. If a decline in external uncertainty is treated as a decline
in external environmental risk, our results are consistent with their findings. We complement
this prior research further by differentiating termination outcomes and stressing the







SIC M2. Mining and construction (SIC 10–17) 25.00 0.00 4
SIC M3. Manufacturing (SIC 20–39) 12.41 11.19 411
SIC M4. Transportation, communications,
electric, gas, and sanitary services (SIC 40–49)
35.29 5.88 17
SIC M5. Wholesale and retail trade (SIC 50–59) 10.00 10.00 10
SIC M6. Finance, insurance, and real estate
(SIC 60–67)
20.00 0.00 10
SIC M7. Services (SIC 70–89) 14.29 0.00 7








We argued that a decline in environmental risk has a negative effect on foreign firms’
propensity to divest IJVs (hypothesis 1b). Our findings reveal the existence of such a negative
effect beginning in the second year of an IJV’s life. We argued that as environmental risk in
the PRC declines, the option to divest an IJV becomes less valuable, and thus, firms are less
likely to exercise this option. Our findings contrast with prior research that emphasizes the
role of IJVs in mitigating substantial environmental hazards (Henisz, 2000); this prior
research implies that as environmental hazards decline, a firm’s need to mitigate hazards
through an IJV also declines. Prior research thus suggests that a reduction in risk would
increase rather than decrease the likelihood of IJV divestment. The discrepancy between the
results of this study and prior results is due to the fundamentally different role that
uncertainty plays in real options logic as opposed to other theoretical frameworks, including
for example, institutional theory.
Taken together, our findings regarding hypotheses 1a and 1b underscore the different
roles that a decline in environmental risk can play in firms’ decisions onwhether to buy out or
divest their IJVs in the PRC. This insight is important for research on IJV termination.
Although it acknowledges the different ways in which a firm can terminate an IJV, research
on IJV termination has traditionally treated IJV dissolution as an undifferentiated event and
explored the factors that drive dissolution in general, without accounting for different types
of termination. Nemeth and Nippa (2013) suggest that the lack of attention to differentiation
makes it difficult to compare the various studies on the determinants of IJV dissolution. The
findings of past research on IJV dissolution, particularly research that equates dissolution
with failure, must be interpreted with this distinction in mind because divestments and
acquisitions may indicate different levels of IJV success (Hennart and Zeng, 2002; Kumar,
2005; Reuer and Zollo, 2005).
We further hypothesized that higher partner-related risk arising from having multiple
partners would increase the likelihood that a foreign firm will either exercise the call option
that is embedded in an IJV by acquiring the IJV (hypothesis 2a) or the put option that is
embedded in an IJV by divesting the IJV (hypothesis 2b). We suggested that the existence of
multiple partners is a central source of endogenous risk in IJVs in the PRC,wheremultipartner
IJVs are more common. However, we found support only for hypothesis 2a. Our findings
contrast with prior research that does not differentiate the termination modes and provides
mixed evidence on the effect of multipartner risk (Beamish and Kachra, 2004; Chung and
Beamish, 2012). By differentiating the termination modes, we show that foreign firms in the
PRCaremore likely to acquire IJVswith higher partner-related risk but do not choose to divest
IJVs with higher partner-related risk. We suggest that this is because partner-related risk is
endogenous and not exogenous; i.e. there is no incentive for the foreign partner to abandon the
PRC. Therefore, the foreign partner may prefer the call option over the put option.
We also found support for the expected weakening over time of the positive effect of
a decline in environmental risk on a firm’s decision on whether to acquire an IJV
(hypothesis 3a). Our expectation was based on the role that behavioral uncertainty plays in
the choice of governance structures according to TCE (Williamson, 1991). Based on TCE
logic, we suggested that a change in governance structure from an IJV to a wholly owned
operation through the acquisition of an IJV in response to a decline in environmental risk
becomes a less favorable alternative as behavioral uncertainty decreases and relational
capital increases. Because behavioral uncertainty declines over time, we expected the effect of
a decline in environmental risk in the PRC on the likelihood of IJV acquisition to decline with
IJV age. In addition, we provide evidence showing that the negative effect of a decline in
environmental risk on firms’ propensity to divest IJVs becomes stronger as IJV age increases
(hypothesis 3b). We argued that the relational capital that develops as IJV partners work
together over time affects the degree to which a decline in environmental risk affects how
firms terminate their IJVs in the PRC. Prior research underscores the role of relational capital
IMR
and the associated decline in perceived partner-related uncertainty in the formation and
structuring of strategic alliances (Dyer, 1997; Gulati, 1998; Gulati and Singh, 1998). We
supplement prior research by providing evidence that relational capital also has an indirect
effect on how firms terminate alliances. The empirical support for these hypotheses
underscores the usefulness of combining TCE-based reasoning with options logic when
explaining a firm’s choice of IJV termination mode.
Our results provide empirical support for the expectedweakening over time of the positive
effect of the partner-related risk associated with an increase in the number of IJV partners on
the likelihood that a foreign firm will acquire an IJV (hypothesis 4a). We argued that the
relational capital developed as an IJV ages will compensate for greater risk associated with a
larger number of partners. However, we did not find support for hypothesis 4b, where we
argued that the positive effect of partner-related risk on the likelihood that a foreign firm will
divest an IJV weakens over time. There may thus be factors that increase, rather than reduce,
the likelihood that IJVswill be terminated over time, thus cancelling out the direct effect of IJV
age on IJV dissolution. Chung and Beamish (2012) suggest that the effect of multipartner
complexity on the termination of IJVs depends on whether the IJV has already undergone
some form of structural change. Assuming that older IJVs are more likely to have undergone
structural change, this would imply that older IJVs are more likely to be terminated than
younger IJVs. Prior research that investigates how the risk of alliance dissolution varies over
the lifetime of an alliance has yielded inconsistent findings (e.g. Beamish and Kachra, 2004;
Hennart and Zeng, 2002; Mohr et al., 2016a, b; Park and Russo, 1996). Although we do not
investigate the direct effect of IJV age on the likelihood of various IJV termination outcomes,
our findings for hypotheses 4a and 4b suggest that accounting for different termination
outcomes may explain the inconsistent research results that have been obtained thus far.
Overall, while we found support for the hypothesized effects on foreign firms’ acquisition
of their IJVs in the PRC, three of the hypotheses explaining firms’ divestment of IJVs based on
exogenous and endogenous risk were not empirically supported, indicating that divestment
may be driven by exogenous or endogenous risks that are not captured in our explanatory
variables. For example, rather than the changes in overall environmental risk in the PRC that
we considered in our study, dissolution may be caused by changes in the industry-specific
environment. Prior research has highlighted the role of industry-level changes in IJV
dissolution (Hennart et al., 1998; Kogut, 1991). In addition, our use of the number of partners to
proxy for the level of endogenous risk in an IJV is likely to capture not only the additional
risks associated with an increase in the number of partners but also the additional benefits of
having access to a more diverse set of partner resources and capabilities, which is of
particular importance in the case of the PRC (Chung and Beamish, 2012; Mohr et al., 2016a, b).
The latter may positively affect the likelihood of acquisition but reduce the likelihood that a
foreign firm wants to divest its IJV in the PRC, thus compensating for the effect of greater
levels of endogenous risk. Other indicators may better reflect the level of endogenous risk. In
particular, prior research has highlighted the greater behavioral uncertainty and likelihood of
conflict associated with parity IJVs (Killing, 1983). Our findings underline this logic, given
that we find statistically significant positive coefficients in all our models for the effect of
equal equity stakes (parity IJV) on the likelihood that firms divest an IJV (please see Table 6).
7.1 Theoretical implications
Recent research has begun to investigate and differentiate among the drivers of different IJV
termination modes (Mata and Portugal, 2015; Puck et al., 2009). Thus far, however, our
understanding of what drives firms to terminate an IJV by acquiring operations rather than
divesting operations remains limited. Our study contributes to this understanding by
complementing options logic with TCE logic to highlight the effects of exogenous and




Options logic specifically emphasizes the role of (the changes in) exogenous risk (Ahsan
andMusteen, 2011; Folta, 1998), but the questions of why and when a firm decides to exercise
the call (acquisition) or put (divestment) option contained in their IJVs have received relatively
little attention. By incorporating insights from TCE logic, we highlight how the effects of
exogenous and endogenous risk on the value of different options embedded in IJVs – and thus
the likelihood of different IJV termination outcomes – varies over time. Complementing
options logic with TCE arguments also highlights IJV age as a boundary condition when
options logic is applied to explain firms’ choice of IJV terminationmode.We thus contribute to
the development of options logic by showing that the relationship implied by options logic is
complemented by direct and moderating effects that are explained by TCE.
7.2 Managerial implications
The findings of our study have implications for managerial practice. In particular, framing
IJVs as real options suggests that firms may use such ventures to “test” overseas markets
before committing to particular ways to serve a particular market. This is particularly the
case when the development of overseas markets is uncertain, as it allows firms to reduce the
downside risk associated with an overseas investment. Managers should continuously
monitor the development of this uncertainty when making decisions regarding whether or
how to terminate an IJV. Our findings show that once environmental risk declines, firms are
likely to terminate their IJVs by acquiring them. Our findings also show that over time (from
the second year onwards), a decline in environmental risk reduces the likelihood that a foreign
firm will divest an IJV, and this effect becomes stronger with IJV age.
Our findings suggest that in the case of multipartner IJVs, which are associated with
greater levels of partner-related risk, firms are more likely to acquire an IJV than divest it. We
suggest that thismay be due to the particular resource contribution of the partners that a firm
is more likely to maintain if it acquires the IJV instead of divesting it. Firms that consider the
termination of an IJV should thus assess the consequences of different types of termination
for their access to particular resources provided by their IJV partner(s).
Our study suggests that the development of both environmental risk in amarket aswell as
partner-related risk, and their interaction with the age of an IJV influence how firms use the
options provided by an international joint venture. Specifically, managers should be aware of
the role of relational capital developed in the course of a collaborative venture. Prior research
has highlighted the positive effects of relational capital on IJV survival (Park andRusso, 1996;
Slater and Robson, 2012). However, our findings indicate that there are possible downsides of
the development of such relational capital, as it might lead to a decreased sensitivity to
environmental changes. Managers need to be aware that relational capital might affect their
perception of and reactions to changes in both environmental and partner-related risk.
Managers thus need to be aware of the role that relational capital accrued over time plays in
decisions on whether and how to terminate an IJV.
7.3 Limitations and directions for further research
Our study has several limitations that open various directions for future research. First, we
did not obtain data to capture other factors that may influence firms’ decisions to acquire or
divest IJVs. For example, we did not obtain data on firms’ strategic priorities, which may
change after IJV establishment (Koza and Lewin, 1998) and may affect the likelihood of
different termination outcomes. Research on business exits emphasizes firm performance as
a determinant of firm exits. Peel and Wilson (1989), for example, examine firm solvency and
its effect on the survival, merger or failure of firms. The database that we used does not
provide any information about IJV performance. Future research should use survey data to
capture and account for the effects of IJV performance. Additionally, we did not obtain
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information on the foreign firms’ experience in the PRC at the time of establishing a particular
IJV other than the experience they obtained through operating other IJVs in the country.
Finally, we did not obtain any information on the buyer in cases where an IJV was sold, and
the likelihood of divestment may be affected by the existence and nature of potential buyers.
It seems that future research examining these additional factors would be worthwhile [7].
Second, consistent with much of the prior research that draws on options logic, we focus
on the foreign firms’ perspective without accounting for the perspective of the local firm (e.g.
Cuypers and Martin, 2010; Kumar, 2005; Reuer and Tong, 2005). Although there have been
efforts to account for all partners’ assessments of their respective options, such work remains
conceptual (Buckley and Casson, 1998; Chi, 2000). Moreover, prior research has accounted for
the perspectives of both partners (e.g. Mata and Portugal, 2015), but this research does not
apply options logic. Future research should thus attempt to examine the termination
outcomes of IJVs, taking into account all of the involved parties’ perspectives. This may
require in-depth case studies of terminated IJVs given the difficulties in obtaining data on the
characteristics and goals of all partners involved in IJVs.
Third, the options that we consider are complete divestment and complete acquisition of
IJVs. We do not consider changes in equity shares. Although they do not focus on explaining
JV termination modes, Folta and Miller (2002) explain sequential increases in minority
investments made by firms outside the biotechnology industry in potential acquisition
targets in the biotechnology industry. Similarly, Shi and Iriyama (2010) analyze how the
initial design of an equity partnership influences its subsequent ownership evolution. We
investigated our sample for incremental changes in ownership over time but found very little
evidence of such changes. Accordingly, we treated acquisitions and divestments as discrete
events. Similarly, we did not account for the fact that firmsmay have divestedmultiple IJVs in
a given year. Future research should provide a more finely grained analysis of the paths that
lead firms to acquire or divest IJVs and take into account the effect of concurrent (dis-)
investments in a particular country.
Finally, we studied foreign firms’ IJVs in the Peoples’ Republic of China. The environment
in the PRC is arguably more dynamic than in Western developed countries or Japan. In such
circumstances, both IJVs as operation modes for foreign firms as well as the termination of
these IJVs in response to changes in exogenous risk are thus likely to be of particular
importance. Our findings are thus most likely to be relevant for foreign firms operating in
countries with similar conditions. In particular, conditions in emerging or developing
economies appear to be similar to those in the PRC, although there is of course significant
variety across emerging economies (Meyer, 2015). Future research should thus explore
whether the relationships proposed in this study hold in other emerging economies or in
developed economies; such an analysis would provide a more conservative test of our
hypotheses, given their comparatively lower environmental dynamism. IJVs in the PRC are
more likely to involve multiple partners due to the particularly strong governmental
involvement in economic activity, which frequently leads to the participation of state-
controlled actors (Mohr et al., 2016a, b). Both of the drivers that we investigated in our study,
i.e. the change in environmental risk and the risk associated with an increasing number of IJV
partners, thus seem of particular importance for foreign firms in the PRC. Future empirical
studies on the role of these factors in countries in which multipartner IJVs are comparatively
less common would thus provide a more conservative test of the suggested relationship and
examine the degree to which the effect might be specific to the particular context of IJVs in the
PRC. Similarly, we studied IJVs that were established between 1985 and 2010, and we
determined whether they were still in operation or had been terminated by the end of 2014.
We suggested that the general effect of changes in environmental risk on IJV termination will
exist in other time periods as well, although the magnitude of such changes may of course




termination, specifically in cases in which such changes were less pronounced than in the
PRC from 1985 to 2014 [8].
8. Conclusion
Our study was motivated by the lack of explanations of the conditions under which firms
divest or buy out IJVs. We provide an explanation that combines options logic with insights
from TCE and relates a decline in environmental risk and partner-related risk to firms’
choices of IJV terminationmodes.We argue that a decline in environmental risk increases the
likelihood that firms will terminate IJVs through acquisition but reduces the likelihood that
firms will terminate IJVs through divestment.We also find that partner-related risk increases
the likelihood that firms will terminate IJVs through acquisition but does not affect the
likelihood that firms will terminate IJVs through divestment. Additionally, we hypothesize
and find that the effect of a decline in environmental risk on both types of IJV termination
varies with the age of an IJV. Finally, we find that the positive effect of multipartner risk on
the likelihood that a foreign firm will acquire an IJV weakens over time.
Notes
1. Uncertainty and risk have been distinguished by the fact that in contrast to the former, the latter can
bemeasured and often be attributed to particular sources (M€ullner, 2016). In our empirical setting, we
measure the risk arising from particular sources. We therefore use the terms uncertainty and risk
interchangeably, which is also the case in much of the research on firm internationalization (Liesch
et al., 2011).
2. The foreign partners of these IJVs were from 29 countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, the
Cayman Islands, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong,
India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore,
South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, the UK, the United Arab Emirates and
the USA.
3. We carried out factor analysis without rotation, but ran the analysis with rotation as a robustness
test. The results of these analyses are reported in the section on the robustness tests.
4. We also use the six dimension framework proposed by Hofstede et al. (2010) as an alternative
measure for cultural distance as a robustness check.
5. The industry dummies were as follows: SIC M1. Agriculture, forestry, and fishing (SIC 01–07); SIC
M2. Mining and construction (SIC 10–17); SIC M3. Manufacturing (SIC 20–39); SIC M4.
Transportation, communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services (SIC 40–49); SIC M5.
Wholesale and retail trade (SIC 50–59); SIC M6. Finance, insurance, and real estate (SIC 60–67);
and SIC M7. Services (SIC 70–89).
6. We would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for highlighting the possibility of a
honeymoon period.
7. We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for highlighting this issue.
8. We would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing out this issue.
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